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ABSTRACT
Twenty-first-century problems cannot be solved with twentieth-
century solutions. This applies with particular force to securities
regulation, in which regulators must constantly adapt to rapid financial 
innovation. In an era of high-frequency trading and unprecedented
market connectivity, the SEC has struggled to apply its existing 
regulatory framework. Specifically, the Commission’s tiered civil-
penalty regime—a remnant of the 1990 Penny Stock Reform Act—is 
outdated and presents a number of challenges as applied to
sophisticated trading violations. Primarily, the current structure, which 
allows Administrative Law Judges to punish financial misconduct for 
each illegal “act or omission” that has occurred, permits excessive 
discretion to impose monetary penalties and can result in varying 
penalty amounts. This lack of predictability introduces too much
uncertainty into market behavior and also accelerates settlement rates, 
depriving industry members of valuable precedent. Punishing for each 
“act or omission” can also be an improper proxy for the severity of a 
particular offense, such as when a single act causes severe damage to
market confidence. This Note argues that Congress should alter this 
outdated tier structure in favor of a gain-based penalty system, which 
would reduce variability and more accurately punish wrongdoing. 
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2014, Athena Capital, a New York–based trading firm, 
agreed to pay a $1 million penalty to settle charges in what the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) called the first-ever 
high-frequency trading manipulation case.1 
Athena used an algorithmic trading model to “mark the close”2 
of securities in its portfolio.3 Marking the close entails purchasing a
large portion of a stock’s outstanding securities at the tail end of a 
trading period to boost reported trading volume, which in turn
artificially inflates the share’s closing price and pads the value of the
actor’s holdings before the market has an opportunity to correct itself.4 
This process is illegal under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)5 and also constitutes a 
“manipulative” practice under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.6 Athena’s algorithm allowed it to engage in tens of 
thousands of these transactions in the final seconds of each trading day 
for six straight months.7 
1. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges New York-Based High
Frequency Trading Firm with Fraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices (Oct. 16, 2014)
[hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n], https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/ 
2014-229 [https://perma.cc/HX7D-ALPR]. As part of the settlement, Athena did not have to
admit to any wrongdoing. Id.
2. This practice is also referred to as “painting the tape” or “banging the close.” Peter J.
Henning, Markets Evolve, as Does Financial Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013, 7:01 AM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/markets-evolve-as-does-financial-fraud [https://
perma.cc/693X-KCYG]. 
3. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1.
 4. Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front
Running” in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607, 648 n.180 (2015).
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a) (2018)); Scopino, supra note 4, at
645.
6. Rule 10b-5 is the linchpin of SEC fraud enforcement actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018)
(prohibiting manipulative and deceptive devices); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the
Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881,
889 (2010) (“Rule 10b-5 is generally acknowledged as designed to prevent fraud and deception in
connection with securities trades.”). 
7. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. In a separate but fascinating 
point, there is an ongoing debate as to whether manipulation that is achieved through trading 
alone should be considered illegal. See also Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V.
Rauterberg, Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 69 (2018)
(offering an analytical framework to answer the complex question of “[w]hether trading activity
alone can ever be considered illegal manipulation under federal law” (emphasis omitted)). See
generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market











   
 
 
   
  




   




    
  
  
    
 
 4312019] DAZED AND CONFUSED
Although the case settled, the Athena trades raise interesting 
questions for future cases with regard to the calculation of SEC civil 
penalties in an era of high-frequency trading and rapid market 
responses.8 Because the existing penalty framework permits one
maximum penalty amount for each “act or omission” in violation of the
securities laws,9 and because Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) can 
broadly interpret the definition of “act or omission” when setting 
penalty amounts in SEC proceedings,10 the maximum conceivable
penalty in a case such as Athena’s is virtually limitless.11 
Some background on SEC civil penalties will help illustrate the 
dynamic. A civil penalty is a monetary fine the SEC imposes on those 
who violate the securities laws. It is a key weapon in the Commission’s 
arsenal of sanctions, along with disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and 
industry bars.12 But the civil penalty’s use and importance have 
increased over time, growing in tandem with the SEC’s authority to 
impose such sanctions.13 Although penalty amounts have dropped 
during the Trump administration,14 the total penalties imposed in 2017 
nonetheless reached over $830 million,15 compared to $43 million in 
2000.16 
Congress first granted the SEC the ability to impose fines in 1984 
through the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, but the Commission’s 
Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 481 (2018) (arguing that the SEC should emphasize harm to the 
market as the distinguishing factor between legal and illegal open-market transactions).
 8. See infra Part II.B (discussing the finance industry’s infatuation with responsiveness and 
connectivity).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g).
 10. See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
 11. See infra Part I (describing the process and authority by which ALJs issue penalties and
the differing interpretations of the “act or omission” language).
 12. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(e)–(g) (enumerating some of the key sanctions available to the
SEC).
 13. See infra Part I.A (describing this historical development).
 14. See Ben Protess, Robert Gebeloff & Danielle Ivory, Trump Administration Spares 
Corporate Wrongdoers Billions in Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/03/us/trump-sec-doj-corporate-penalties.html [https://perma.cc/3T52-B7AS] (describing
a 52 percent drop in financial penalties imposed by the SEC—including fines and disgorgement— 
between the Obama administration and the Trump administration).
 15. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R69-5GV3] 
(comparing total penalty amounts in 2016 and 2017). This number is down from around $1.3 
billion in 2016. Id.
 16. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2000), https://www.sec.gov/pdf/ 
annrep00/ar00full.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDG42BKS].
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432 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429
authority was limited to seeking penalties only for insider trading.17 
The scope of the SEC’s civil-penalty authority steadily grew, however, 
culminating in the Dodd-Frank Act’s articulation of the current 
framework.18 Dodd-Frank grants the SEC free rein to impose
monetary penalties on anyone who “is violating or has violated” any 
federal securities law, with the lone criterion that the penalty be “in the 
public interest.”19 Federal courts review penalty amounts with an
“extraordinarily deferential” standard.20 The only true check on the 
SEC’s discretion is the penalty limits enumerated by Congress, which
establish a maximum fine for each “act or omission” that violates one
of the securities laws.21 The maximum amounts are organized by tiers 
that vary with the severity of the violation, ranging from $7,500 to 
$150,000 for persons and from $75,000 to $725,000 for other entities.22 
This framework is a remnant of the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.23 
The maximum-penalty tiers are likely meant to be a check to
reduce the chances of an overly burdensome punishment and ensure 
proportionality between the transgression and the penalty.24 However, 
the interpretation of the “act or omission” language has been
construed by the SEC and its ALJs in a number of different ways, 
which can expand or shrink penalty amounts drastically and can bypass 
the requirements of the penalty tiers. Other authors have identified the 
differing interpretations of the language; practitioner Jon Eisenberg,
for example, compiled a useful set of recent cases to portray the 
17. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2018)).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g). The “in the public interest” language has taken on its own doctrine 
and does act as a limitation on the total amount of penalties. See infra notes 85–86 and 
accompanying text.
 20. See Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“SEC sanctions are not to be
disturbed unless they are ‘unwarranted in law or . . . without justification in fact.’” (omission in 
original) (quoting Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185–86 (1973))). 
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g)(2).
 22. Id. These numbers are for violations of the Securities Act of 1933; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-2 (establishing similarly structured penalties with slightly different amounts in the
corresponding provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
 23. Compare Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 101
Pub. L. No. 429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (establishing a tiered
structure for penalties), with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 929P (same).
 24. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 12 (1990) (describing the tier structure as a response to concerns
that “without further limitation, the maximum penalty amounts could be imposed for minor,
inadvertent violations that did not cause significant harm”).











      
       
 
 









   
   
  
 4332019] DAZED AND CONFUSED
variations.25 ALJs have interpreted each “act or omission” to mean, 
inter alia, the number of investors injured by the conduct, the number 
of distinct acts of negligence, and the duration of the misconduct.26 In
applying Dodd-Frank to Athena Capital, for example, an ALJ could 
have interpreted a single “act or omission” to be each trade, each day 
of trading, or the scheme as a whole. 
Some commentators believe that Rapoport v. SEC27 and Collins v. 
SEC28 have the potential to limit the agency’s discretion.29 In Rapoport, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied a penalty based
on the number of years a fraud was ongoing.30 In Collins, the D.C.
Circuit, despite declining to find that a penalty was arbitrary and 
capricious, articulated that the process for making such a 
determination is a review of sanctions in prior similar cases.31 However, 
these cases appear to have had little impact on the SEC’s sanctioning 
policy and merely force the Commission to link each violation to the 
“act or omission” language superficially.32 
This Note will argue that the current framework grants too much 
discretion to ALJs in setting penalty amounts and that the problems 
arising from that discretion will be exacerbated by technological 
developments in the industry. Instead, Congress should consider a new 
statutory framework that bases penalties on the total amount of gain
earned through misconduct. Although there is an ongoing, heated
debate about the constitutionality of the SEC’s ALJs and the level of 
autonomy and authority granted to them in general under Dodd-
Frank,33 the arguments in this Note will focus solely on the policy 
25. Jonathan N. Eisenberg, Calculating SEC Civil Money Penalties, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Calculating SEC Civil Money
Penalties], https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/24/calculating-sec-civil-money-penalties
[http://perma.cc/GAY6-BUJ9].
 26. Id.; see also infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (exploring these alternatives in
slightly greater detail).
27. Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
 28. Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
29. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Calculating SEC Civil Money Penalties, supra note 25. 
30. Rapoport, 682 F.3d at 108.
 31. Collins, 736 F.3d at 526.
 32. See infra Section I.C (evaluating the minimal impact that Rapoport had on interpretive
discretion).
 33. See generally Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 
71 BUS. LAW. 1 (2015) (describing some of the constitutional arguments against ALJ authority).
A recent case, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), declared the process of nominating ALJs
unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause. Id. at 2054–55. While the case catalyzed 
important changes to the process through which ALJs are appointed, it did nothing to stymie their 
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434 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429
concerns of the current penalty regime. Furthermore, there is a robust 
and growing literature on the proper way to penalize corporate 
malfeasance.34 This Note aims to supplement that commentary but
with an emphasis on securities violations. 
Part I of this Note will describe the background and history of the 
SEC’s authority to impose penalties, as well as the current framework 
the Commission applies and the various ways ALJs have interpreted
the statute. Part II will explore various challenges presented by an 
unpredictable and varied interpretive framework. First, unpredictable 
judgments prohibit parties from properly weighing the potential risks 
of their conduct, especially in cases where the Commission should be 
concerned with overdeterrence of conduct beneficial to the industry. 
Incoherent amounts might also contribute to a higher settlement rate,
which deprives the public of valuable administrative precedent and 
impedes the development of the law. Furthermore, the statutory
language is inadequate in providing guidance to the Commission for 
violations involving high-frequency trading and other modern forms of
market manipulation. These modern frauds defy the language for a 
number of reasons. Because fraud through high-frequency trading 
includes thousands of “acts or omissions,” ALJs can functionally 
disregard the tier requirements mandated by Congress. Conversely, 
because the market is “too linked to fail,”35 even one egregious act can 
cause extreme damage to the market and warrants more than a single 
maximum-tier penalty.
Part III will propose alternative solutions to this growing issue. 
Any change must appropriately weigh the desire for flexibility in 
administrative proceedings with the need for uniformity and 
predictability in the enforcement process. The SEC could adopt 
interpretive guidance that dictates how ALJs should treat the “act or
omission” language in different scenarios. A more effective change,
however, would be a new gain-based statutory framework, which 
would not only be easy to implement and administer but would also 
actual authority. See id. (holding only that SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States” and thus
subject to the Appointments Clause).
 34. See generally, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. 225 
(2018) (critiquing the lack of appropriate gradation in federal criminal punishments). 
35. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1274 (2017)
[hereinafter Lin, New Market Manipulation] [hereinafter Lin, New Investor]) (“[T]he new 
financial reality’s heavy emphasis on connectivity has created the systemic risk of ‘too linked to
fail.’” (quoting Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 678, 714–16 (2013)).
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 4352019] DAZED AND CONFUSED
result in predictable penalty amounts that more closely mirror the 
severity of the wrongdoing.
I. THE SEC, CIVIL PENALTIES, AND APPROACHES TO
INTERPRETATION
The SEC’s enforcement authority has not been static; it has slowly 
developed since the Commission’s creation in 1934. And although the
Commission now has the go-ahead from Congress to fine any violator 
of the securities laws, the vagaries of the penalty framework have
resulted in a variety of divergent calculation methodologies when
imposing such fines. ALJs use this wide discretion—which often
remains unchecked by judicial or administrative mechanisms—to set 
total penalty amounts as they see fit, sometimes incompatibly with the
tier framework. This Part will trace the history of SEC authority to 
impose penalties, describe the various ways in which modern ALJs 
interpret the statutory language, and then briefly discuss some
attempts by federal judges to reduce the variability of penalty amounts.
A. The History and Authority of SEC Administrative Proceedings 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Act, a far-reaching statute that expanded governmental 
oversight of Wall Street practices and aimed to protect consumers from
abusive tactics.36 Dodd-Frank in part granted the SEC enormous
authority in § 929P(a) to adjudicate securities cases through internal 
agency proceedings and set remedies and sanctions without suing in 
federal court.37 This is considered by some to be the most important 
grant of authority to the agency in its history.38 The inclusion of 
§ 929P(a) was likely an attempt to streamline the enforcement process 
while reducing expenditures of federal resources.39 
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
 37. Id. § 929P(a). For the full text of the statute, see infra note 55.
 38. See, e.g., Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 45, 50–51 (2016) (“This was the most significant expansion of the SEC’s authority to use
administrative enforcement in its more than eighty-year history.”).
 39. See id. at 51 (“The scant legislative history indicates that the SEC and Congress primarily
hoped to enhance the Division’s efficiency—and administrative enforcement generally is both
quicker and less expensive . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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436 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429
The SEC has not always had authority to hold its own proceedings
and impose such broad sanctions.40 Originally, the Commission had to
bring a civil action in federal district court to obtain penalties for any 
violation.41 The civil monetary penalty was not even available to the 
SEC as a remedy between 1934, when the SEC was created, and 1984.42 
The SEC’s ability to seek civil penalties began with the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,43 followed by the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.44 However, these civil 
penalty schemes lacked the expansive characteristics that are typical of 
the SEC’s current remedial authority. For instance, the Commission’s
ability to seek penalties was limited in scope, applying only to insider-
trading violations, and any penalty action needed to be brought in
federal court.45 Additionally, the fines under these early acts were 
capped at treble penalties, or three times the amount of gain or 
damages.46 The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 represented a huge jump in power, permitting SEC 
penalties for violations of any of the four major securities acts.47 The
key difference between the 1990 legislation and Dodd-Frank is that in 
the earlier Act, the Commission could only hold administrative 
proceedings against regulated entities, such as those registered with the 
SEC.48 Also, penalties in court proceedings differed slightly from
40. See id. at 46 (observing that the SEC’s civil-enforcement powers were limited before
Dodd-Frank).
41. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
§ 3(a), 102 Stat. 4677, 4677 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78u-1 (2018)); Jon Eisenberg, Making Sense of 
SEC Civil Money Penalties, LAW360 (Mar. 4, 2014, 2:24 PM) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Making
Sense of SEC Civil Money Penalties], https://www.law360.com/articles/512850/making-sense-of-
sec-civil-money-penalties [https://perma.cc/622P-W5QY].
 42. Eisenberg, Making Sense of SEC Civil Money Penalties, supra note 41.  
43. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
44. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 
Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
45. Id. § 3(a).
46. Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990
Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 8 (1994); see also Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 3(a) (“The amount of the penalty . . . shall not exceed
three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful [conduct].”).
47. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The four major securities acts
described are the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. Id.
 48. Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical
Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 322–23 (2017) [hereinafter Velikonja, Empirical
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internal actions; they did not follow the same tiered system but were 
capped at the amount of pecuniary gain or harm.49 
Although Dodd-Frank is the final and current iteration of the
SEC’s civil-enforcement authority, it did not vary the tier structure
from the 1990 Act. According to Dodd-Frank, the Commission can 
commence a “cease-and-desist proceeding,” adjudicated by agency-
appointed ALJs, which considers whether a person or corporation has 
violated any securities law.50 Upon determination that a violation has 
occurred—or is about to occur—the SEC can order the individual or 
entity to “cease and desist” from committing further violations and can 
impose sanctions and remedies on the defendants.51 The three most 
impactful and commonly used remedies are: (1) disgorgement, which 
forces the defendant to return any profits gained through the illicit
conduct;52 (2) industry bars, in which the SEC can stop a wrongdoer 
from working in finance for a given duration—or indefinitely;53 and (3) 
civil monetary penalties.54 
Most relevant to this Note is the Commission’s authority to issue 
civil penalties, an example of which can be seen in 15 U.S.C. § 77h-
1(g).55 Disgorgement and civil penalties at first glance seem to be very
Investigation]; see also id. at 322 (“[Section 929P(a)] streamlines the SEC’s existing enforcement
authorities by permitting the SEC to seek civil money penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings 
under Federal securities laws.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, § 211, at 78 (2009))). 
49. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 13 (1990) (“The same tiering of penalties applies to court
proceedings, with one major difference: within each tier, the maximum penalty is the greater of
the dollar amount specific or the gross amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of 
the violation.”). This difference still exists today. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2) (2018) (establishing
the same distinction within each tier).
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a). 
51. Id. § 77h-1(e)–(g). Also, the SEC currently has “almost unlimited discretion” in deciding
whether to adjudicate a case as an administrative proceeding or in federal court. Mark, supra note 
38, at 57–58. For reference, in the first half of 2016, the SEC adjudicated 88 percent of its cases as
administrative proceedings. Id. at 46–47. 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(e). 
53. Id. § 77h-1(f). 
54. Id. § 77h-1(g); see also Davis M. Becker, What More Can Be Done To Deter Violations
of the Federal Securities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1852 (“As is well known, the remedies
available to the SEC for securities laws violations include injunctions and other court orders,
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and civil penalties.”).
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g). The statute reads:
Authority to impose money penalties 
(1) Grounds In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), the Commission
may impose a civil penalty on a person if the Commission finds, on the record, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, that—
(A) such person—
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438 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429
similar, requiring the defendant to pay a lump sum fine. But 
disgorgement is about restitution and unjust enrichment—funds paid
through disgorgement are often returned to victims through a “fair 
fund”56—whereas the civil penalty is an additional fine that focuses on 
deterrence and punishment.57 Moreover, the amount to be returned in
disgorgement must be calculated exactly, tracing accurately which 
profits were ill-gotten.58 Conversely, calculating civil penalties is a 
much more discretionary process, and the ultimate sanction amount is 
reserved for determination by the ALJ or federal judge and is based
(i) is violating or has violated any provision of this subchapter [15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a et seq.], or any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter [15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.]; or
(ii) is or was a cause of the violation of any provision of this subchapter [15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq.], or any rule or regulation thereunder; and
(B) such penalty is in the public interest.
(2) Maximum amount of penalty 
(A) First tier The maximum amount of a penalty for each act or omission
described in paragraph (1) shall be $7,500 for a natural person or $75,000 for any
other person.
(B) Second tier Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the maximum amount of
penalty for each such act or omission shall be $75,000 for a natural person or
$375,000 for any other person, if the act or omission described in paragraph (1)
involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a 
regulatory requirement.
(C) Third tier Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), the maximum amount 
of penalty for each such act or omission shall be $150,000 for a natural person or
$725,000 for any other person, if— 
(i) the act or omission described in paragraph (1) involved fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory
requirement; and
(ii) such act or omission directly or indirectly resulted in—
(I) substantial losses or created a significant risk of substantial losses to
other persons; or
(II) substantial pecuniary gain to the person who committed the act or
omission.
(3) Evidence concerning ability to pay In any proceeding in which the Commission may 
impose a penalty under this section, a respondent may present evidence of the ability 
of the respondent to pay such penalty. The Commission may, in its discretion, consider
such evidence in determining whether such penalty is in the public interest. Such
evidence may relate to the extent of the ability of the respondent to continue in
business and the collectability of a penalty, taking into account any other claims of the 
United States or third parties upon the assets of the respondent and the amount of the 
assets of the respondent.
Id.
 56. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair 
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (2015). 
57. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing administrative goals of
punishment).
 58. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Since 
disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may exercise its equitable
power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing.”).
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on an assessment of the facts. Defendants can appeal ALJ decisions to 
federal court, but the standard is “extraordinarily deferential.”59 
Furthermore, many defendants charged by the SEC often settle prior 
to adjudication.60 
To initiate an administrative proceeding and issue sanctions, all
that is required is that the Commission issue an Order Instituting 
Proceedings, which in sum need only include a “simple statement of 
the alleged violation.”61 What follows is a hearing adjudicated by an 
ALJ, who can issue subpoenas on any relevant party and is not bound 
by the Federal Rules of Evidence.62 Once the hearing is initiated, the
ALJ may impose a fine as long as it adheres to the statutory
requirements and is in the “public interest.”63 The ALJ’s opinion and 
findings are then released in a written opinion.64 
The legislative history of the 1990 Act does indicate that SEC civil
penalties were designed to increase agency flexibility in enforcement.65 
But flexibility should not necessarily imply unfettered discretion. This 
Note does not claim that ALJs are acting outside of the scope of their 
authority when they articulate varying interpretations of what 
constitutes a single “act or omission”; it merely questions the prudence
of allowing such discretion in an acts-based system. The adoption of 
the penalty tiers was an affirmative choice by Congress, which indicates 
that it anticipated some degree of limitation on penalty amounts.66 
However, in the current system, described in greater detail in the next 
Section, the Commission can basically bypass those limitations with the
amount of discretion it exhibits. 
59. Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also id. at 103 (“[W]e must uphold
the Commission’s legal conclusions unless they are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))). 
60. See Velikonja, Empirical Investigation, supra note 48, at 347 (aggregating data from
2007−2015 to fnd that only 2.2 percent of defendants litigated their cases to trial during that time
period).
 61. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 835 (8th ed. 2017).
 62. Id.
 63. Id. 
64. Id. at 836.
 65. See S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 9–10 (1990) (“The authority provided by [the Act] will give
the SEC and the courts the flexibility to better tailor a remedy to the facts and circumstances of
the violation.”); id. at 12 (“[T]he Committee believed that, in practice, [within each tier,] the
courts and the SEC would administer the new penalties fairly . . . .”).
66. In fact, an alternative system without tiers was expressly proposed and rejected. Id. at 12
(noting that the initial legislation had only a single tier).
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B. Calculating Civil Penalties 
When assessing penalties, ALJs look first to the tier system, which 
is the heart of Dodd-Frank’s penalty clause. Congress laid out a 
maximum penalty amount for each “act or omission” that violates 
securities laws.67 The tiers are organized into three separate categories 
of increasing severity. The third and highest tier, which allows for a
maximum penalty of $150,000 for persons and $725,000 for corporate
entities, is reserved for violations involving fraud, deceit, or reckless 
disregard of a regulatory requirement that result in either substantial 
gain for the defendant or substantial loss for other investors.68 A 
second-tier violation, with maximums of $75,000 for persons and
$375,000 for corporate entities, does not require the substantial gain or 
loss factor of the third tier, but it still must involve fraud, deceit, or 
reckless disregard.69 The first tier, which has a $7,500 maximum for 
persons and a $75,000 maximum for corporate entities, is essentially a
residual category for any violation that does not feature fraud, deceit,
or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement.70 However, the tiers 
merely set out a maximum punishment allowable under the law; the
SEC can set penalties within each tier at its discretion. 
The adjudicator then “must determine how many violations 
occurred and how many violations are attributable to each person, as 
the statute instructs.”71 Each violation is multiplied by an amount the
judge deems appropriate for each act, with the statutory tiers acting as
a ceiling.72 In court proceedings—as opposed to internal adjudications 
in front of ALJs—federal judges are allowed to increase the total 
penalty up to the amount of pecuniary harm or gain if the tier structure
results in too low of a penalty.73 
ALJs have interpreted an “act or omission” to mean a number of 
different things. The number of “acts or omissions” present in any 
illegal scheme could be measured by the number of illegal 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2018). See supra note 55 for the full text of the statute.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g).
 69. Id. 
70. Id. The SEC adjusts these numbers as inflation requires. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS TO THE CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES ADMINISTERED BY THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/enforce/civil-
penalties-inflation-adjustments.htm [https://perma.cc/LM23-S69N].
71. Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g).
 73. Id. § 77t(d). Insider-trading violations have their own penalties, which are capped at 
three times the gain earned or loss avoided. Id. § 78u-1.
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transactions,74 the number of investors injured,75 the number of 
fraudulent statements made to investors,76 the number of distinct acts 
of negligence,77 or the duration of the fraud.78 Alternatively, the
adjudicator could consolidate multiple distinct acts into what 
commentators call a “course of conduct.”79 Essentially, the discretion
afforded to the adjudicator in determining what constitutes an “act or 
omission” allows him or her to reverse-engineer an appropriate penalty 
amount by manipulating the statutory language to fit the calculation. 
The tiers for general violations serve as a check on ALJs, but in 
practice, any intention by Congress to limit discretion is defeated by 
illegal conduct that entails a large number of individual acts. A prime 
example of the malleability and meaninglessness of the “act or 
omission” standard is In re optionsXpress, Inc.80 There, a clearinghouse 
failed to comply with the requirement that it rectify, or “close out,” any 
position in which it failed to deliver securities that it had contracted to 
sell to customers.81 The Commission credited the expert testimony that 
74. See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
 75. See George N. Krinos, Initial Decision Release No. 929, 113 SEC Docket 679, at *23
(ALJ Dec. 21, 2015) (considering a number of different options for what constitutes an act, but 
deciding arbitrarily “that nineteen violations, based on each investor whom [the defendant] 
defrauded as a result of his misconduct, is a reasonable unit of assessing penalties”); see also
Walter V. Gerasimowicz, Initial Decision Release No. 496, 106 SEC Docket 3639, at *7 (ALJ July 
12, 2013) (“The events at issue will be considered as thirteen courses of action, one for each
investor in [Respondents’ fund] harmed by Respondents’ fraudulent conduct.”).
 76. See Total Wealth Mgmt., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 860, 112 SEC Docket 1345, 
at *45 
(ALJ Aug. 17, 2015) (“Instead, I calculate violations based on the number of [the defendant’s
disclosure forms] in which material misstatements were made.”). 
77. Thomas R. Delaney II, Initial Decision Release No. 755, 109 SEC Docket 962, at *62
(ALJ Mar. 18, 2015) (equating each act of negligent oversight to a single violation).
 78. See J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., L.P., Securities Act Release No. 10100, Exchange Act
Release No. 78098, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4431, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 32152, 114 SEC Docket 1855, at *29–30 (June 17, 2016) (upholding an ALJ
determination that at least eighteen separate violations occurred—one for each month the fraud
continued). The Commission in this case specifically addressed the concern in Rapoport, but it
allowed a durational calculation because it corresponded to the number of violations. Id. at *25– 
28.
 79. See Eisenberg, Calculating SEC Civil Money Penalties, supra note 25; see also Reliance
Fin. Advisors, LLC, Initial Decision Release No. 941, 113 SEC Docket 1355, at *26 (ALJ Jan. 11,
2016) (grouping penalties into “categories” of violations and imposing a penalty of $125,000 for
each category); David B. Havanich, Jr., Initial Decision Release No. 935, 113 SEC Docket 1039, 
at *12 (ALJ Jan. 4, 2016) (finding that operating as an unregistered broker-dealer for two years
“will be considered as one course of action” for the purpose of setting fines).
80. optionsXpress, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10125, Exchange Act Release No. 78621, 
114 SEC Docket 4786 (Aug. 18, 2016).
 81. Id. at *4. 
LIEBMANN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2019 8:17 AM       












   







   
      
 
  
   
  
 
     
  
442 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429
optionsXpress failed to deliver these securities according to regulation 
approximately 1,200 times.82 It accordingly bypassed the maximum tier
and affirmed the ALJ’s total penalty of $2 million.83 This comes out to
around $1,666 for each act, though the Commission declined to 
articulate how it arrived at that number. Although the SEC determined
that optionsXpress’s conduct fell within the third tier because it “acted 
in deliberate and reckless disregard of its regulatory obligations over a
prolonged period,” even after explicit guidance from regulators as to 
the conduct’s illegality, the discussion was moot, and the tiers 
themselves were irrelevant, because the amount per act fell well below 
even the first-tier maximum.84 
There are some other criteria that help ALJs determine an
appropriate penalty, but those are similarly subjective and flexible. For 
example, when deciding the penalty amount within each tier, and when 
assessing the total fine, statutory provisions require that the 
adjudicators must also consider whether the penalty is “in the public
interest.”85 In addition to statutory criteria that a judge may assess
when establishing this determination,86 judges may also consider:  
(1) the egregiousness of the violations at issue, (2) defendants’ 
scienter (3) the repeated nature of the violations, (4) defendants’ 
failure to admit to their wrongdoing; (5) whether defendants’ conduct 
created substantial losses or the risk of substantial losses to other 
persons; (6) defendants’ lack of cooperation and honesty with
authorities, if any; and (7) whether the penalty that would otherwise 
be appropriate should be reduced due to defendants’ demonstrated
current and future financial condition.87 
Some ALJs have adopted other unofficial rules, such as not issuing 
a penalty that exceeds the amount of disgorgement.88 This is likely a 
82. Id. at *55.
 83. Id. at *58.
 84. Id. at *54.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g)(1)(B) (2018). 
86. Id. § 80a-9(d)(3). 
87. Ambassador Capital Mgmt., Initial Decision Release No. 672, 108 SEC Docket 2637, at
*76 (ALJ Sept. 19, 2014) (quoting SEC v. Lybrand, 281 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2003),
aff’d, 425 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2005)).
 88. See Newbridge Sec. Corp., Initial Decision Release No. 380, 96 SEC Docket 241, at *72
(ALJ June 9, 2009) (“Civil penalties in a higher amount [than the defendants’ pecuniary gain] are 
not consistent with the public interest.”). But see J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., L.P., Securities Act
Release No. 10100, Exchange Act Release No. 78098, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4431, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 32152 (June 17, 2016), supra note 78, at *2 (finding that
the Commission is not constrained by that informal rule).
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continuation of earlier SEC penalty frameworks, in which the amount 
of harm or gain was used as a cap on penalty amounts, or an imputation
of the federal court penalty structure which has the same cap.89 
C. Courts’ Ineffective Attempts to Address Penalty Disparities 
Commentators point to two cases that have the potential to limit 
the variability and unpredictability of penalty amounts: Rapoport v.
SEC and Collins v. SEC. These cases certainly trend in the right 
direction by attempting to curb the discretion afforded to judges and
ALJs in imposing penalties, but in practice, they do very little to 
provide actual structure or predictability to penalty calculations. 
1. Rapoport v. SEC. The D.C. Circuit briefly addressed the 
varying interpretations of “act or omission” in the 2012 case Rapoport 
v. SEC.90 There, the SEC charged Dan Rapoport for failing to
appropriately register himself and his Russia-based trading firm as a
foreign broker-dealer before soliciting institutional investors.91 
Rapoport failed to respond to the initial order, and the ALJ entered a
default order against Rapoport and imposed sanctions accordingly, 
including a civil monetary penalty of $315,000.92 The ALJ calculated 
that amount by imposing a maximum second-tier penalty for every 
year that Rapoport operated unregistered.93 The circuit court vacated
the penalty because the ALJ failed to follow the language set by 
statute, which requires that the judge determine “how many violations 
occurred.”94 It found that using the number of years did not equate to 
the number of violations.95 
Some commentators believed that Rapoport could rein in the 
discretion of the court.96 However, its holding on penalties is very
narrow. All it requires is that an ALJ justify its amount using the “act 
89. See, e.g., supra notes 46, 49, and 73 and accompanying text.
90. Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
 91. Id. at 99–100. 
92. Id. at 101–02. 
93. Id. at 108.
 94. Id.
 95. Id. Other ALJs, even after Rapoport, have held that a durational-based analysis is
appropriate in certain circumstances. See supra note 78.
 96. See Eisenberg, Calculating SEC Civil Money Penalties, supra note 25 (“It is not clear
whether all of these decisions would survive appellate scrutiny [after Rapoport].”).
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or omission” language.97 Even the court in Rapoport acknowledges 
that the standard for reviewing penalties is “extraordinarily
deferential.”98 The court did state at one point that “agencies must 
apply their rules consistently . . . [and] may not depart from their 
precedent without explaining why,” but that was in regard to the 
underlying substantive claim, not the penalty calculation.99 It is unlikely
that the court meant to imply that ALJs must pick just one
interpretation of “act or omission.”  
And any value of Rapoport has clearly been ignored or read on
the narrowest grounds by ALJs; in 2016, four years after Rapoport, the
Commission cited a D.C. Circuit case from 2004 that stated the SEC is 
“not obligated to make [its] sanctions uniform.”100 Despite Rapoport’s 
purported influence, ALJs retain a substantial amount of power to set 
penalties.101 No appellate court has overturned a penalty based on 
Rapoport.102 
2. Collins v. SEC.  Collins v. SEC offers a different way to restrain
ALJ discretion. The case suggests that if a court finds that the penalty 
is arbitrary and capricious, then the total penalty should be limited in
some manner.”103 There, the D.C. Circuit again opined that the ratio of 
the civil penalty to the value of disgorgement could be an
informative—although not decisive—determinant of the 
appropriateness of a penalty.104 Collins could provide some relief for 
defendants by placing an upper bound on penalties. Although the case 
97. See Rapoport, 682 F.3d at 108 (“To impose second-tier penalties, the Commission must 
determine how many violations occurred and how many violations are attributable to each
person, as the statute instructs.”). 
98. Id. at 107.
 99. Id. at 104.
100. J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., L.P., Securities Act Release No. 10100, Exchange Act Release
No. 78098, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4431, Investment Company Act Release No.
32152 (June 17, 2016), supra note 78, at *20 (June 17, 2016) (quoting Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481,
488 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
101. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (describing the different methods ALJs
have used in post-Rapoport cases). 
102. As of June 2, 2019, Lexis Advance lists six cases that cite to Rapoport, and not one of the 
courts uses it as grounds for overturning a penalty based on the calculation methodology. For a 
list of these cases, see https://tinyurl.com/y2ff24n8 [https://perma.cc/VPE3-SUC7] (citing
Decisions for Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, LEXIS ADVANCE RESEARCH, 
https://tinyurl.com/y2ff24n8 [https://perma.cc/VPE3-SUC7]).
 103. See Collins v. SEC, 736 F.3d 521, 524–26 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (considering but ultimately
rejecting an argument that an SEC penalty was arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)).
 104. Id. at 526.
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is aimed at establishing a reasonable penalty cap, it does not grapple 
with the “act or omission” language and does little to provide guidance 
on how to calculate a penalty within the acceptable range accurately
and objectively. The court even recognized that precedent ranges from
penalties equaling disgorgement to penalties twenty-five times 
disgorgement.105 And the precedent-driven approach does not help
with new and innovative conduct for which there is no baseline to 
compare. 
* * * 
As demonstrated, the use of civil penalties has expanded
drastically over the years.106 Due to upheaval surrounding the SEC’s 
authority to seek disgorgement,107 the Commission might begin to seek 
more monetary penalties, although downward pressure from the
Trump administration might keep the number down overall in the 
short term.108 Given this potential increase in the use of civil monetary
fines, resolution of the penalty framework becomes all the more 
pertinent.
Ultimately, judicial review can do very little to force more
structure into a statutory system that has only fed into regulators’
discretion and ability to issue penalties. The following Parts will
describe in greater detail some of the major policy concerns with such 
a system. 
105. Id. at 525.
 106. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (describing the increase in penalty amounts
over time). This expansion is probably primarily driven by the ever-growing latitude given to the
SEC by Congress, and the ease through which penalties can be assessed in-house at the SEC
rather than in court. See Mark, supra note 38, at 50–51 (confirming the growing number of cases
the SEC adjudicates internally, especially after Dodd-Frank).
 107. See, e.g., Patrick L. Butler, Note, Saving Disgorgement from Itself: SEC Enforcement
After Kokesh v. SEC, 68 DUKE L.J. 333, 351–55 (2018) (analyzing Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 
(2017), an opinion that seemed to limit the SEC’s authority to issue disgorgement). Much of the 
federal courts’ powers to authorize disgorgement comes from equitable principles; Kokesh casts
doubt on whether disgorgement is in fact an equitable remedy, or whether it actually looks
substantially like a penalty, which would require statutory authority to impose. Id. at 354. This
author posits that such uncertainty could cause the SEC to seek penalties under the existing
structure rather than risk seeking disgorgement and have it overturned later on. 
108. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (chronicling the decline in penalty amounts
during Trump’s presidency). This drop is probably a function of President Trump’s general
deregulatory agenda and a shift in his political priorities. See Protess, Gebeloff & Ivory, supra
note 14 (“The decline in corporate penalties from the Justice Department may partly reflect the
Trump administration’s heavier emphasis on immigration, violent crime and drugs.”). 
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II. PROBLEMS WITH AN ACT-BASED CALCULATION
Excessive discretion in imposing penalties presents a number of 
challenges. First, Section A of this Part will explore how penalty 
amounts that vary greatly introduce uncertainty into the conduct of 
industry members. Section B describes how this discretion to interpret 
what constitutes an “act or omission” will become an increasingly 
prevalent problem with the advent of algorithmic trading systems, 
which will contribute to the incoherence of penalty amounts.  
A. The Economics of Punishment 
An adjudicator’s unchecked discretion to impose civil penalties as 
he or she sees fit can have a negative impact on the market in two
critical ways. First, unfettered discretion decreases the predictability of 
penalty amounts, potentially overdeterring certain actors. Second, it 
can incentivize settlement in a larger amount of cases. Though
settlement is generally a beneficial mechanism in the judicial system, 
oversettlement in novel or impactful cases can potentially rob actors of
important and useful precedent. Each of these potential disadvantages 
to unchecked discretion in penalty awards is explored more fully 
below.
1. Predictability and Overdeterrence. The SEC’s lack of uniformity 
in applying the Dodd-Frank penalty framework introduces 
unnecessary uncertainty into the market and might be harmful to the
financial sector and society in general. Although uncertainty might 
itself deter intentional fraudsters or other egregious actors, the Dodd-
Frank penalty regime covers all wrongdoing, both intentional and
unintentional.109 The Commission should consider the impact of 
uncertainty on behavior that falls on the borderline of legality, 
potentially resulting in the overdeterrence of some socially beneficial
behavior.
Economic analysis pervades the regulatory decision-making 
process.110 Agencies must constantly consider whether regulating a
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2018) (granting the SEC power to authorize penalties for any
person that “is violating or has violated any provision of [the Securities Act of 1933],” not just 
intentional violations). 
110. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Jerry L. Mashaw, Regulatory Decision-Making and
Economic Analysis, in 3 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 59, 60–61
(Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS]
(exploring various ways in which regulators use economic analysis to control risk).
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certain group or certain conduct meets the economic cost-benefit
justification. This is especially true in the enforcement context, where 
regulators must determine whether the cost of detection and
investigation truly warrants agency action.111 Cost-benefit analysis is 
equally relevant in ascertaining appropriate punishments for violations 
of those regulations.112 Under a traditional deterrence model of 
punishment—which is a central justification for SEC fines113— 
penalties induce compliance with laws by forcing wrongdoers to 
internalize the societal harm of their actions.114 
Central to the economic analysis of deterrence is the impact of 
disincentives on behavior.115 The main philosophy underlying agency 
actions is that firms—and people—are rational profit maximizers.116 In 
a nutshell, this theory postulates that when considering whether to 
move forward with conduct, a firm will compare the perceived benefit 
of noncompliance with the potential downside of acting.117 If the 
benefit is greater than the risk—calculated by multiplying the resulting 
punishment with the probability of detection—it will choose to 
violate.118 In order to deter the conduct, then, an agency has to set a
penalty that makes the punishment greater than any benefit.119 And 
deterrence penalties do more than just curb intentional misbehavior;
111. Id.
 112. See Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 860–62 (2012)
(examining the economic approach to agency punishment).
 113. See Walter V. Gerasimowicz, Initial Decision Release No. 496, 106 SEC Docket 3639, at
*7 (ALJ July 12, 2013) (“Penalties in addition to the other sanctions ordered are necessary for the 
purpose of deterrence.”); see also Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Statement
Regarding Agreed Settlements with Elon Musk and Tesla (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/public-statement/clayton-settlements-elon-musk-and-tesla#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/JD4F-
K78V] (“At the Commission . . . we seek to serve [the interests of ordinary investors] to the extent
practicable while also ensuring that we remediate and deter misconduct. In addition, holding 
individuals accountable is important and an effective means of deterrence.”).
 114. Minzner, supra note 112, at 856. 
115. See Isaac Ehrlich, Economics of Criminal Law: Crime and Punishment, in  OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 110, at 295, 297 (characterizing the basic
deterrence model by syllogism: “People respond to incentives. Offenders are people too.
Therefore, by transitive logic, offenders respond to incentives”).
 116. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453–54
(2003). 
117. Id. at 461–62. Although this is a simplistic, assumption-based model, scholars have found 
that the deterrence model is more effective in agency law than in tort and criminal law because
agencies control the entire enforcement process. Minzner, supra note 112, at 915–16. 
118. Minzner, supra note 112, at 860. 
119. The agency may do this by requiring disgorgement, which automatically offsets any gain. 
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Any additional civil penalty, then, is in furtherance of
this goal of deterrence.
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they can also influence behavior that occurs unintentionally by 
incentivizing an actor to invest in so-called “self-monitoring” policies 
to mitigate the possibility of a violation.120 
But regulatory bodies can choose to what degree they want to
deter wrongful conduct. In a “complete deterrence” model, deterrence
is the sole imperative. Penalties are set as high as possible with the
singular goal of stopping the behavior.121 Although there are certain
types of intolerable conduct that warrant complete deterrence, such as
pure fraud and murder, an “optimal deterrence” model is more
appropriate under most circumstances involving “less-than-absolutely
undesirable activities.”122 That theory stipulates that penalties should
not be just an arbitrary number greater than the gain earned through 
noncompliance. Instead, they should be at a level at which the net 
social benefit from the violation exceeds the net social costs.123 
Agencies have multiple competing goals in their regulatory
mandates aside from deterrence, and they should consequently 
operate in an “optimal deterrence” framework. The SEC, for example, 
aside from deterring bad behavior, must also ensure that markets are
running smoothly and effectively to facilitate capital formation.124 The 
SEC should therefore implement a punishment model that helps it
meet those goals when setting penalty amounts. 
The risk of using a heavier hand than necessary in inducing 
compliance is the worry known as “overdeterrence,” which occurs 
when penalties are higher than optimal. This “could create excessive
incentives to avoid harm and could thus overdeter socially desirable 
conduct.”125 Though excessive punishment can lead to overdeterrence,
120. Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 88 (1997) [hereinafter Cooter, Punitive Damages]; see also Robert D.
Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 86 (1982) (“When 
punitive damages are imposed for unintentional fault, the cost of making errors increases, causing 
injurers to invest more in avoiding mistakes.”). This was a part of the rationale for the original
1990 Act. See Laby & Callcott, supra note 46, at 11 (“[Richard Breeden, the former SEC chairman
who proposed the 1990 legislation,] argued that the prospect of economic sanctions would cause 
institutions to allocate more resources to achieve compliance. Breeden urged that this rationale
applied even as to non-intentional misconduct, such as record-keeping and customer protection
violations.” (footnote omitted)).
 121. Minzner, supra note 112, at 880–81. 
122. Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 491, 542 (2017). 
123. Minzner, supra note 112, at 860. 
124. Our Goals, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/our-goals
[https://perma.cc/R3Q6-639N].
125. A. Douglas Melamed, Damages, Deterrence, and Antitrust—A Comment on Cooter, 60
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 93–94 (1997). If the line between a procompetitive information 
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so can legal uncertainty. Behavior that results in unintentional 
violations is where uncertainty can be the most detrimental.126 
Overdeterrence is most likely to occur in cases where “the location of
the line between desirable and undesirable—between liability and no 
liability—is uncertain.”127 
Unpredictable punishments can result in overdeterrence in the 
same way that legal uncertainty does. Predictability is a fundamental 
aspect of the enforcement process. Because the amount of the fine is 
an important variable in the risk–reward dichotomy, if a party cannot 
properly determine what the fine will be, it cannot properly weigh risk.
Civil penalties, then, can have an overdeterrent effect if they are issued 
arbitrarily and unpredictably. In the context of judicial punitive 
damages, commentators have long established the need for predictable 
and consistent penalties.128 Uncertain penalties may therefore similarly
chill innovative behavior that could have a net benefit to society and 
can lead to an inefficient allocation of investment in compliance
programs. 
Moreover, the line between legal and illegal conduct can blur 
when new technologies develop that do not fit the statutory mold, just 
adding another layer of uncertainty to the mix. An area in which 
overdeterrence is a more pressing concern is the injection of smart
technology into the financial sector, which increases efficiency and
value for market participants.129 Financial models and algorithms allow 
consumers to have greater access to the capital markets and 
information about their investments and can help investors allocate 
and manage risk.130 The adoption and implementation of new 
technologies could be inhibited by the uncertainty—both legal and 
punitive—inherent in the regulation of these innovations.131 These are
developments that financial regulators need to foster, not deter.  
exchange and an anticompetitive, illegal information sharing scheme is uncertain, and the
consequences unclear, then the desirable behavior could be deterred. See id. at 94 (giving the
example of a procompetitive information exchange among a trade association).
 126. Id. at 93. 
127. Id.
 128. See Cooter, Punitive Damages, supra note 120, at 74 (“Inconsistent awards of punitive
damages muddle the message conveyed by the courts concerning the seriousness of the wrong.”).
 129. Lin, New Investor, supra note 35, at 687–93. 
130. Id. at 699–700. 
131. Other scholars have already identified this issue and are trying to mitigate it from a
regulatory perspective. See generally Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation
Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019) (proposing a new framework through which policymakers
should view the tradeoff between innovation and regulation).
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The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) even released a
2019 report that highlighted the growing regulatory uncertainty in a
variety of financial-technology contexts.132 Such uncertainty “can 
negatively affect many different stakeholders” and thus “policymakers 
may consider ways to . . . integrate fintech into the regulatory
framework.”133 One area of regulatory uncertainty the CRS identified 
is robo-advisers.134 Robo-advisers are “online financial product[s] that 
provide[] automated, algorithm-based wealth management services”
and can offer cheap, active investment management for consumers 
without the high fees generally associated with a human adviser.135 This
enhances the ability of underserved communities, who cannot 
normally invest, to participate in the markets.136 But legal uncertainty 
surrounding developers’ liability, duties, and potential punishment 
under the Advisers Act might stymie additional investment in these
types of low-cost, easy-access investing tools.137 
2. The Influence of Unpredictability on Settlement Economics. 
Next, unpredictability in how ALJs will penalize a party in an official 
proceeding reinforces a system of widespread settlement that is already
prevalent in the industry.138 Settlement economics is an imperative part 
of litigation strategy.139 A rational defendant will choose to settle if the 
settlement amount is less than the liability expected in litigation, which
can be calculated by multiplying the probability of a litigation loss by
the expected judgment and adding the total expected costs of legal 
132. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FINANCIAL INNOVATION: REDUCING FINTECH
REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11195
[https://perma.cc/SX83-Q8A6].
 133. Id. at *1. 
134. Id.
135. Bret E. Strzelczyk, Note, Rise of the Machines: The Legal Implications for Investor
Protection with the Rise of Robo-Advisors, 16 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 54, 56 (2017). Robo-
advisers are predicted to be managing $2 trillion in assets by 2020. Id. at 62–63. 
136. Id. at 83–84 (“These robo-advisors . . . mean[] that non-typical investors in rural areas,
minorities, and youthful investors now have access to investing and can better plan for
retirement.”). 
137. See id. at 63 (arguing that the Advisers Act is incapable of addressing robo-adviser issues
and that the resulting legal uncertainty may “negatively impact . . . the industry’s innovative 
solutions for providing services to lower income clients and other fixed income trading”).
 138. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
 139. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Litigation and Settlement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 623, 624 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014)
(establishing the standard economic model employed by litigants when deciding whether to
settle).




















       
  
     
   
 
 
   
   
  
   
 
  
    
 4512019] DAZED AND CONFUSED
representation.140 In the same way that uncertainty warps the calculus 
of a rational actor choosing to engage in illegal behavior, uncertainty 
as to the judgment similarly alters how a litigant views a settlement deal 
by clouding the expected value calculations of proceeding to trial.
Settlement in general is good for the court system.141 In the agency
context, it can reduce administrative costs and more efficiently stretch 
agency resources.142 However, settlements make more sense when 
being negotiated between “equal parties.”143 This balance of power is 
lacking in the SEC’s cases, mostly because “[t]he SEC sits as the
primary drafter, interpreter, and rule and regulation enforcer, and
claims various moral, intellectual, political, or economic legitimacy.”144 
Even in cases against large, sophisticated, and wealthy parties, the 
SEC’s coercive power still exists, in part due to the reputational harm 
that an agency action can inflict.145 The ability to reinterpret what
constitutes an “act or omission” only serves to amplify this power. As 
a result, “settlement with the SEC does not look like a negotiated
settlement,” because the SEC’s leverage allows it to aggressively
pursue the same sanctions as it would in a formal adjudication.146 
SEC settlements in the context of such power might not be in the 
public interest. For example, novel cases—which presumably come
with the greatest chance of settlement since the litigation risk is so
high—are actually cases that society should want to go through to
adjudication because it will help set SEC precedent for new sorts of
violations.147 There is an inherent tension between settlement and
precedent creation, and public interest demands a balance between the 
140. Id.
 141. See Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 651 (2007) (explaining that private settlements reduce the
number of trials).
 142. See id. at 669–70 (noting that the SEC has a self-interest in settlements because it allows
the agency to conserve resources). 
143. See id. at 659 (describing how settlements between equal and similarly situated parties
amount to a reflection of the will of both parties). 
144. Id.
 145. See id. at 664–65 (outlining the reputational and economic harm that follows SEC
enforcement). This reputational harm is not just dignitary; SEC discipline can trigger “bad actor”
clauses that “disqualify individuals and entities from taking advantage of exemptions and other
regulatory dispensations,” such as beneficial, capital-raising safe harbors. COX ET AL., supra note 
61, at 856.
 146. Johnson, supra note 141, at 661.
 147. See id. at 679 (describing the benefit of creating precedent from novel cases).
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two.148 “The loss of substantive law from the public realm [from too
much settlement] distorts the legal landscape, limits public testing and 
debate of legal norms, and devalues or destroys institutional 
competencies.”149 Furthermore, a dearth of precedent probably
increases settlement rates because the lack of formal guidance means
less clarity for litigants on vague legal standards, which in turn 
magnifies the unpredictability of proceeding to trial, creating a vicious 
cycle. And although settlements with the SEC end up in the public
sphere as quasi-precedential press releases, these announcements lack 
the depth, clarity, and predictive strength of a true court or
administrative opinion.
B. Applying the “Act or Omission” Language to Market 
Manipulation and High-Frequency Trading 
The technological era has drastically altered the landscape of the 
financial markets, bringing an unprecedented level of information 
sharing and market connectivity. In particular, the advent of
algorithmic trading models and high-frequency trading has allowed 
securities trading to occur at a speed and magnitude never before
imagined. The Dodd-Frank penalty framework, which is largely an 
adoption of the 1990 Act, is ill-suited to combat these changes. This 
Section will briefly lay out common forms of market manipulation and 
how they have changed with new technology. Then, it will argue that 
these developments can lead to even greater incoherence in penalty
amounts issued by the SEC.  
1. Market Manipulation Basics. People have been attempting to
manipulate the stock market since the invention of securities
exchanges.150 As early as the 1600s, brokers of the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange would go to coffeehouses to spread false rumors about 
stocks and record fake transactions in order to raise prices.151 These are
early versions of market manipulations, along with many other creative 
148. Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 256 (1999). 
149. Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
 150. See David J. Leinweber & Ananth N. Madhavan, Three Hundred Years of Stock Market
Manipulations, 10 J. INVESTING 7, 8 (2001) (describing the rise of market manipulation, such as
“painting the tape” and spreading false rumors, in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the 1600s).
 151. Id.




















    
   
  







   
    
 4532019] DAZED AND CONFUSED
methods that continue to be used today.152 The point of market
manipulation is to “us[e] distortive market power, deceit, 
misinformation, and illicit information . . . to distort the natural price 
of certain financial instruments or transactions to the benefit of the
manipulative party.”153 
Although the mechanics of specific types of market manipulation
are outside the scope of this Note, some examples of manipulative
practices will add context to the discussion.154 One classic form of
market manipulation is a “pump-and-dump” scheme, as dramatized by
the Jordan Belfort biopic The Wolf of Wall Street.155 A pump-and-dump
is usually perpetrated by brokers and involves acquiring a position in a 
cheap stock—usually a penny stock156—and then using aggressive
tactics and false advertising about the underlying company to push up
the price while unloading it on customers.157 The brokers earn the
difference on the inflated value—as well as high commissions on the 
sales—while the customers will be stuck with an investment that drops 
in value the moment the market realizes the shares are overpriced.158 
Spreading false rumors to increase the market price is a method of 
manipulation that is similar to the pump-and-dump, albeit different in
scale. Elon Musk did this when he falsely tweeted that he would be 
taking Tesla private at $420 a share, pushing the stock price up when 
there was little evidence to support the rumor.159 
Another category of market manipulation is the “wash sale.” This 
is the recording of fake transactions “with the goal of creating artificial 
152. See Lin, New Market Manipulation, supra note 35, at 1281–82 (describing different types
of traditional market manipulation). 
153. Id. at 1281.
154. For a more in-depth discussion of these tactics, see generally id.
 155. See id. at 1285 (referencing THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013)).
156. A penny stock is a share of a small company with a low market capitalization, which
accordingly has a low share price and is thinly traded. COX ET AL., supra note 61, at 1049. Penny
stocks are often easy vehicles for fraud. See id. (“[F]ew doubt that the penny stock market is full
of abuses . . . .”).
 157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Dave Michaels, Susan Pulliam, Tim Higgins & Michael Rapoport, SEC Sues Elon Musk 
for Fraud, Seeks Removal from Tesla, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2018, 10:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-sued-by-the-sec-for-securities-fraud-1538079650
[https://perma.cc/ZE67-L6P8]. Musk later settled, agreeing to pay a $20 million settlement and
refrain from acting as chairman for three years. Mark H. Anderson & Dave Michaels, Federal
Judge Approves Elon Musk, Tesla Settlements with SEC, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2018, 1:57 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-approves-elon-musk-tesla-settlements-with-sec-
1539699262 [https://perma.cc/J7K7-BJCE]. 
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movements in volume and price in the marketplace.”160 Because the
market sees the volume of trading as an indication of high demand— 
or in some cases an adverse event—volume changes can influence
stock prices.161 For example, someone could both buy and sell shares of 
the same security to create the illusion that demand has increased, 
when in fact the demand is a manufactured mirage.162 Once the market
responds, the perpetrator sells the stock to lock in the gains before the 
price reverts.163 Marking the close is similar to a wash sale, but it is 
targeted at the very end of the trading period.164 Each of these methods 
violate Rule 10b-5’s ban on “manipulative” practices.165 
2. The Evolution of Market Manipulation. With the introduction 
of the internet, digitized exchanges, and high-frequency trading,
market manipulation has become even more sophisticated and
dangerous. The finance industry continues to place a “heavy emphasis 
on connectivity,” with information flowing to all parties 
instantaneously.166 Proponents of the efficient market theory have long
posited that the market’s response to information is fast and that any 
publicly available information is included in stock price.167 But with
modern technology, that response occurs in a flash. Essentially, it has 
become an efficient market on steroids.  
One main factor contributing to these changes is that many traders 
now use computers and artificial intelligence to execute trades.168 
Coders create algorithms that are designed to perform certain 
functions, such as buying or selling securities, based on an array of 
preset criteria or assumptions that the trader chooses.169 These
160. Lin, New Market Manipulation, supra note 35, at 1283. 
161. Id. at 1283–84. 
162. Id.
 163. Id. at 1284. 
164. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
 165. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
 166. Lin, New Market Manipulation, supra note 35, at 1274. 
167. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (“With many
professional investors alert to news, markets are efficient in the sense that they rapidly adjust to
all public information . . . .”).
 168. Lin, New Investor, supra note 35, at 689.
 169. Id. These algorithms can be highly effective. For example:
Some algorithms may utilize historical troves of data to gauge past patterns of wins and
losses, or survey current markets to figure out immediate trends for momentum-driven
trading. Instructions also set limits on when an algorithm should stop trading. Sharp or
sudden falls in market prices, unexpected events, or low payoffs may trigger a rapid
exit from the market.

























     
     







 4552019] DAZED AND CONFUSED
algorithms can react to market events much faster than humans ever 
could and “can process a deluge of information in real time, spot 
trends, and react accordingly within seconds.”170 And because some of
these financial models are coded to react to market trading, financial 
institutions have become, in the words of one commentator, “too 
linked to fail,” with any issues sending “ripple[s] across the system.”171 
One example of this is the 2010 “Flash Crash,” in which $1 trillion of 
market value was erased in a span of thirty minutes.172 The primary
catalyst for the crash was a trader in his house engaged in a form of 
high-tech market manipulation.173 
The next step above algorithmic models is high-frequency trading,
in which a computer can execute a large number of trades within 
milliseconds.174 For investors whose livelihoods turn on the ability to
act quickly to gain an “alpha”—an excess or abnormal return above
the market175—the invention of high-frequency trading was an
inevitable development. The instant response time allows users to be 
“incredibly profitable,” but at the same time, these models have the 
potential to “exacerbate volatility” by reacting quickly and with
magnitude to market events.176 
These developments in the financial industry make market 
manipulation easier to achieve and more systemically dangerous. Even
the average investor is completely linked to market information 
systems via the internet and personal trading accounts.177 Material 
Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 1607, 1621 (2015) (footnote omitted). Algorithms can be coded to make trades based on
any number of factors, such as market trends and crowd reactions, or based on highly technical
criteria, such as statistical arbitrage or mean reversion. Shobhit Seth, Basics of Algorithmic
Trading: Concepts and Examples, INVESTOPEDIA (May 4, 2019),
https:/ /www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/101014/basics-algorithmic-trading-
concepts-and-examples.asp [https://perma.cc/5GXV-TWRC].
 170. Lin, New Investor, supra note 35, at 690.
 171. Lin, New Market Manipulation, supra note 35, at 1275. 
172. Id. at 1260. 
173. Id. at 1263. There is some debate as to whether the trader actually caused the damage or
just acted as a catalyst, unveiling the underlying issues that resulted in the crash. Bob Pisani, What
Caused the Flash Crash? CFTC, DOJ Weigh in, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2015, 5:45 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/21/what-caused-the-flash-crash-cftc-doj-weigh-in.html [https://
perma.cc/Y3NZ-2ER2]. 
174. Lin, New Investor, supra note 35, at 691.
 175. Alpha, INVESTOPEDIA (May 3, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alpha.asp 
[https://perma.cc/AH9Q-99NT].
 176. Lin, New Investor, supra note 35, at 692.
 177. See id. at 699 (“Investors today can receive high-quality, user-friendly investment 
information through television, radio, satellite radio, websites, social media tools, smartphone 
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456 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:429
market events show up on news feeds and social media within seconds 
of the event occurring, popping up on screens across the world. Instead 
of a false rumor reaching a select few, a tweet reaches millions of 
people in seconds.178 Within two minutes of Elon Musk’s post, Tesla
shares had jumped 4 percent; within an hour, they had surged to 10
percent.179 Alternatively, a false rumor can be injected into the market 
by much more subtle means. In 2017, the SEC charged Robert Murray 
with fraud after he filed a fake tender offer of Fitbit on EDGAR, the 
SEC regulatory filing portal.180 Murray purchased a large number of 
Fitbit call options before the filing and profited off their sales when
investors responded to the fake offer.181 
Another area where these developments have grown in 
sophistication is in washed orders. In a tactic known as “spoofing,” a
party can submit a large number of buy or sell orders, either above or
below the current market spread, which tricks the other algorithms into
responding, effectively moving the stock price.182 The party then
cancels the orders and can profit off the price swing.183 Spoofing was 
the method of choice for Navinder Singh Sarao, the Flash Crash
trader.184 
In 2017, in response to the danger presented by these 
developments, the SEC created a “Cyber Unit,”185 so one can expect 
the Commission to grow its number of enforcement cases that include 
these types of crimes, exacerbating the issues associated with 
unpredictability. The Cyber Unit focuses on a number of technology-
applications, and other fora, customized to each investor’s interests regardless of their wealth or
connections.”).
 178. See Todd Leopold, In Today’s Warp-Speed World, Online Missteps Spread Faster than 
Ever, CNN (Mar. 6, 2012, 7:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/03/06/tech/social-media/ 
misinformation-social-media/index.html [https://perma.cc/N9VK-HMQU] (highlighting the 
speed at which information spreads through social media). 
179. Kevin Dugan & Nicolas Vega, Tesla Shares Rise 11 Percent After Musk’s Shocking Tweet, 
N.Y. POST (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/08/07/tesla-shares-rise-11-percent-
after-musks-shocking-tweet [https://perma.cc/J7RV-U7R8].
180. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Fake Filer with Manipulating
Fitbit Stock (May 19, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-107 [https://perma.cc/ 
XA7S-CA27].
 181. Id.
 182. Lin, New Market Manipulation, supra note 35, at 1289. 
183. Id.
 184. Pisani, supra note 173.
185. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to
Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/FCK4-K5SA]. 
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based violations, such as market manipulation via social media,
hacking, initial coin offerings, and cyber threats to trading platforms,186 
all of which probably have minimal precedent to draw from to
determine an appropriate penalty.
3. Penalties for Market Manipulation. In this new technological
landscape, a penalty framework that was originally passed in 1990 loses 
any effectiveness and coherence it once had. Punitive damages in 
general are based on the perceived severity of the conduct, but that
brings in the subjective views of both the judge and jury calculating 
them.187 The penalty framework attempts to establish some layer of 
objectivity for ALJs’ calculations, but it fails to do so.188 
Moreover, ALJs are forced to bypass Congress’s statutory 
requirements in order to punish wrongdoers proportionately. For 
example, Elon Musk sent a single tweet that severely impacted the
price of Tesla stock.189 For now, consider this as a single “act” under 
Dodd-Frank.190 Given how quickly the market responded and how fast 
the tweet was disseminated over the internet, it caused a huge degree
of damage to investors. ALJs are statutorily bound, however, to cap 
the penalty at $150,000, the largest individual penalty available in the 
highest tier of the statutory scheme.191 Although ALJs likely would find 
a way to bypass this, they would have to disregard their statutory
mandate in order to do so. From the SEC’s perspective, this might 
actually incentivize the Commission to settle so it does not have to be 
limited by the penalty caps in the statute. The penalty conundrum is 
only partially rectified by the SEC’s ability to sue in federal court, in
which a judge can increase the penalty up to the amount of pecuniary
harm.192 But this route is also a drain on federal resources;
administrative proceedings are much more efficient, and Congress 
likely granted the SEC the power to hold internal proceedings in order 
to avoid the agency having to go to federal court in the first place. 
Of course, the Musk tweet raises the equally pressing question of 
how information passed through public internet forums should actually 
186. Id.
 187. See Cooter, Punitive Damages, supra note 120, at 76 (“Jury intuition about the extent of
punishment provides an uncertain and unstable foundation for law.”). 
188. See supra Part I.B (discussing the statutory framework’s malleability). 
189. Dugan & Vega, supra note 179. 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g)
 191. Id.
 192. See id. § 77t(d). 
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be treated. Is this a single “act,” or is it really millions of acts for every
person the tweet went out to—as if Musk had sent each of them a faulty 
disclosure statement individually? Musk and his lawyers at the very
least were nervous about this scenario, as they agreed to a settlement 
that included a $20 million civil penalty.193 Although he likely agreed 
to pay a higher amount in return for a reduced industry bar, the penalty 
is a far cry from $150,000. This demonstrates just how much the per-
violation statutory scheme is unable to reflect the realities of the
modern market. 
Even if Musk’s conduct was considered millions of smaller acts, 
this alternative scenario results in equally incoherent penalties.
Consider a situation where a firm engages in fraud involving high-
frequency trading, which used hundreds of thousands of faulty trades
over an extended period of time. Did Congress really intend for each
of these trades to be considered a single “act”? Congress did believe 
that ALJs would generally combat this issue by setting a low number 
for each act a firm engages in,194 but it also actively placed the tier 
system in the calculation scheme.195 It is therefore doubtful that 
Congress intended for an ALJ to be able to bypass the tiers 
completely—like in the optionsXpress case196—by interpreting the 
language in such a way that he or she could select the lowest tier and 
then multiply that amount by an incredibly large number.197 Such a 
backdoor calculation scheme effectively eliminates any potential cap
on the penalty. 
III. SWITCHING FROM A VIOLATION-BASED TO A GAIN-BASED 
MODEL
Any change to the method of calculating civil penalties would 
have to occur in one of two forms. The SEC could stick with the
existing language, perhaps by issuing an interpretive rule that provides 
ALJs with guidance on how to handle the “act or omission” language.
Attempting to establish a uniform definition of “act or omission,”
193. Anderson & Michaels, supra note 159.
 194. See supra note 65 (noting that the SEC and courts have flexibility within each tier to
administer fair penalties).
 195. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
196. optionsXpress, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10125, Exchange Act Release No. 78621 
(Aug. 18, 2016), supra note 80.
 197. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (discussing how the ALJ arrived at a large
penalty by multiplying the tier determination by 1,200 individual acts).
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however, would be a difficult exercise because, as demonstrated above,
different types of fraud involve varying numbers of acts with similarly
varying market impact. And any guidance directed at known issues will 
fail to address unforeseeable technological advancements. Instead, 
Congress should alter the very framework itself by changing the 
baseline criterion for penalty amounts, switching to a disgorgement- or
revenue-based model. 
A. Interpreting “Act or Omission” 
In the modern context, a methodology that calculates penalties on 
a per-violation basis is untenable. Although there is a plethora of 
possible interpretations of the “act or omission” language,198 none can
effectively respond to every unique or new set of facts. No matter how 
an adjudicator interprets it, the number of acts is an incomplete proxy 
for the severity of a crime. Choosing just one of the existing 
interpretations will ultimately lead to a tradeoff along the uniformity– 
flexibility spectrum. And attempting to match up each type of conduct 
to a specific interpretation will lead to an overly rigid system incapable 
of handling new forms of misconduct. Although simply raising the tier 
maximums would seem to be an easy fix, it would only serve to increase 
ALJ discretion within each tier and perpetuate the problems identified 
in Part II. 
For example, too much uniformity fails to address egregious 
conduct, especially in new types of cases. There are a few ways to create 
uniformity in the calculation of “act or omission.” Even packaging 
every act into a single “course of conduct,” which likely represents the 
highest degree of uniformity since most penalties would ultimately 
remain at or below a single-tier maximum, overcorrects the issues 
identified in this Note. Such an approach comes with a number of 
problems, which could potentially lead to underdeterrence of illegal
conduct. For example, the maximum penalty tiers would essentially
become true maximums, resulting in penalties that do little to deter 
against conduct that results in millions of dollars of damage or
disgorgement. Moreover, this approach would equate one-time
violations with those that occurred over a span of multiple years. To be 
effective, this approach would have to be paired with statutory change, 
perhaps by drastically raising the numbers enumerated in the tiers. This 
would only magnify the problems with too much ALJ discretion. 
198. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
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Basing penalties off distinct acts of negligence also does not 
adequately reflect the harm done. As discussed earlier, the
interconnectedness of the market can make one act disastrous to 
investors.199 And although ALJs often tailor the punishment to address 
less impactful “acts” by making the penalty per act smaller, an act-
based structure does not address acts that are disproportionately 
harmful, such as Elon Musk’s deceptive tweet. 
The number of investors injured could be an appropriate proxy in 
cases where fraudsters have direct contact with those investors—like a
fund manager who advertises fraudulent returns to induce 
investment—but in an exchange- or market-based fraud, where an
entire market base is impacted, that number loses touch with the actual 
severity of the crime. 
B. Congressional Action 
Congress should therefore pick a new criterion for penalty 
amounts. A proper framework would establish a uniform metric to
provide a basis of certainty for market participants, while also 
presenting flexibility to fit new forms of misconduct and granting 
judges the ability to account for subjective factors. A revenue-centric 
system would effectively balance these goals.
Finding an appropriate metric for severity is key to a consistent 
penalty framework.200 When Congress first granted the SEC the power 
to impose fines on wrongdoers, it recognized that the amount of profit 
gained—or avoided—and the amount of investor harm were
appropriate barometers for the severity of misconduct.201 To that end,
it imposed penalty caps that were based on those numbers.202 And even 
though Dodd-Frank did not continue that practice for ALJs— 
Congress decided to rely exclusively on the tiers—some adjudicators
still implicitly recognize the amount of disgorgement as a measure of
severity, declining to impose penalties that exceed disgorgement.203 
Therefore, returning to a system that formally uses those numbers as 
the baseline measure for penalties would be an intuitive switch and 
199. See supra notes 166–73 and accompanying text (discussing the connectivity of the 
financial system and how financial models are closely linked to market movements).
 200. See Cooter, Punitive Damages, supra note 120, at 74 (“Consistency requires mapping
wrongs ordered by seriousness into punishments ordered by severity.”). 
201. See supra notes 46, 49 and accompanying text (describing how penalties were tied to
pecuniary gain in a number of congressional acts over the years). 
202. See supra notes 46, 49 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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would provide a more accurate, definite, and predictable system of 
punishment. 
England, for example, has a system based on this principle that 
varies substantially from the Dodd-Frank approach. Its penalty system 
is administered by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), which— 
along with the Prudential Regulation Authority—regulates banking
and capital markets in the U.K. Unlike their American counterpart, 
each entity has extensive instructions that dictate how they should
calculate penalties.204 FCA penalties have two segments: disgorgement
and an additional financial penalty.205 The financial penalty is an
assessment of the “seriousness of the breach.”206 In most cases, this
penalty is a percentage of the revenue earned by the violating firm.207 
The FCA uses revenue, instead of disgorgement, to measure the
sanction, but the basic principle remains the same. 
Although it seems that the FCA would encounter a similar issue 
as American adjudicators in defining what a “breach” is, it calculates 
the revenue by consolidating benefits earned for the entire “period” of 
the breach.208 Once the FCA has established the total revenue for the 
period, it uses a comprehensive list of subjective factors to determine
an appropriate percentage ranging from 0 percent to 20 percent.209 
“The more serious the breach, the higher the level.”210 The FCA can 
then adjust the total penalty using a series of aggravating and
mitigating factors, as well as a “deterrence factor.”211 To summarize in 
terms of current ALJ approaches, the FCA first establishes the total
benefit earned from the course of conduct that violates the securities 
laws and then multiplies that number by a percentage that equates to
the severity of the crime. 
204. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE DECISION PROCEDURE AND PENALTIES MANUAL
§ 6.5 (Apr. 2019) [hereinafter UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE MANUAL], 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DEPP/6.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFV4-MLCU]
(outlining the FCA’s penalty-setting regime).
 205. Id. § 6.5.3 (“The total amount payable by a person subject to enforcement action may be
made up of two elements: (i) disgorgement of the benefit received as a result of the breach; and
(ii) a financial penalty reflecting the seriousness of the breach.” (emphasis omitted)).
 206. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
207. Id. § 6.5A.2. 
208. See id. § 6.5A.2(2) (“Where the breach lasted less than 12 months, or was a one-off event,
the relevant revenue will be that derived by the firm in the 12 months preceding the end of the
breach.” (emphasis omitted)).
 209. Id. § 6.5A.2(3). 
210. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
211. Id. § 6.5A.3–4. 
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One critical benefit of this approach is that it strikes a desirable 
balance between objective and subjective factors. Although 
adjudicators retain sufficient discretion to address egregious cases, the 
fact that the “base” number is one that is objectively measured by
calculating the revenues earned can significantly reduce variability. 
And it does not impose any additional burden on the SEC because that
calculation is not so different from how the SEC currently ascertains 
disgorgement numbers.212 The ALJ can still exercise discretion when
applying the factors to determine the percentage multiplier, as well as 
when applying the additional aggravating and mitigating factors. A few 
of the many factors that the FCA uses are the frequency or repetition 
of the conduct, whether the conduct was intentional, remedial steps 
taken or cooperation with authorities, and the defendant’s prior 
disciplinary record.213 But Congress and the SEC would be free to form 
the list as they please and could incorporate the factors currently used
to identify the appropriate tier. These factors would give the agency 
enough latitude to address unique facts of peculiar cases while 
grounding the number within an objective criterion that can only vary 
within a preset range.
This approach might struggle to address cases in which little to no 
financial benefit is earned from the violation. Elon Musk did not
significantly profit off his actions, yet he caused serious damage to 
investors. The FCA addresses these situations imperfectly. In cases 
where the total revenue is not discernible, it has the authority to choose 
another metric aside from revenues.214 This can result in some varied 
judgments depending on the metric selected,215 but the variation is still
212. See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[D]isgorgement 
need only be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.”).
 213. UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE MANUAL, supra note 204, § 6.5A.2. 
214. See UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., THE MANUAL, supra note 204, § 6.5A.2(1) (“However,
the FCA recognises that there may be cases where revenue is not an appropriate indicator of the
harm or potential harm that a firm’s breach may cause, and in those cases the FCA will use an
appropriate alternative.” (emphasis omitted)). Ironically, in one recent case about reporting
requirements, the FCA used the number of reporting mistakes to arrive at the appropriate
revenue. UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINAL NOTICE TO GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/goldman-sachs-international-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8GN-YWGC].
 215. The FCA’s “New” Penalties Regime – How It Is Being Implemented in Practice, KING &
WOOD MALLESONS (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/the-fcas-
new-penalties-regime-how-it-is-being-implemented-in-practice-20160101 [https://perma.cc/ 
V5Y5-QWB2] (noting that although the FCA has primarily used “relevant revenue/relevant
income” as the indicator of harm, the FCA has also relied on its Decision Procedures and
Penalties Manual § 6.5A(13) to apply “alternative figure[s]” in a number of cases).
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less than under a per-violation system. The total amount estimated 
would remain within a fairly predictable range. An optimal framework
would still severely limit such discretion to reduce variability, however. 
To address these situations, an alternative provision could allow the
use of total of investor harm, instead of revenue earned, in certain 
scenarios.216 
CONCLUSION
Congress’s adoption of a penalty framework from 1990 was a 
shortsighted decision, as this outdated method fails to address the
injection of widely used algorithmic trading into the industry. The 
already ambiguous language has become untenable, granting the ALJs 
too much discretion in the sanctioning process and forcing them to
disregard statutory language if they hope to punish wrongdoers 
adequately. The imprecise framework also results in unpredictable and
incomprehensible penalty calculations that incentivize excessive
settlement rates and could stymie desirable behavior. Because the “act 
or omission” standard cannot provide sufficient uniformity, Congress 
should alter the framework to calculate penalties based on a 
percentage of revenues earned through securities violations, similar to 
the U.K.’s FCA. A revenue-based methodology provides for greater
legal certainty, which can lead to appropriate allocation of compliance 
funding and efforts. Because settlements occur for a variety of financial
and reputational reasons, this author cannot ensure that a new penalty-
calculation methodology will cause those rates to fall. However, it is 
clear that the settlement economics under a revenue-based scheme will 
be more lucid, allowing defendants to make more informed decisions 
in negotiations with the government. 
216. It is possible that the level of investor harm is minimal as well but that a violation still 
occurs. The appropriate metric for severity in unique situations like this is something that will
have to be borne out in future cases and scholarship. 
